certainty. So fully convinced are they of their assertions that they hardly ever find it necessary to support their opinions with arguments and to assess the grounds in favor and against their views.3
In the iconography of the ancient scholar, intellectual-but also physicalisolation is a recurrent element. Take the case of Heraclitus: in principle, he does not seem to be averse to engaging with the overall community, but his aspiration is that the community should conform to his ideals. Since such an outcome is not accomplished, he withdraws disdainfully and turns to playing dice with some small boys (D. L. 9.3). However, isolation cannot give rise to debate,4 and if debate does not come into being, then neither does science; moreover, if science does not come into being, neither does a scientific language, nor the interest in creating one. But what is a scientific language? First and foremost, it consists of speakers' willingness to agree on the meaning of certain terms.
In a passage from Politics (1261a15-21), Aristotle writes:
I refer to the ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire state (τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν . . . ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν), which Socrates takes as his fundamental principle. Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point (γινομένη . . . μία μᾶλλον), the city will not be a city at all; for a state essentially consists of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to family and family to individual, for we should pronounce the family to be a more complete unity than the city, and the single person than the family; so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the process.5
But Socrates (i.e. Plato) never uttered the statement attributed to him here. What he asserts is that the good city must be "one", but in the sense of "unitary".6 Aristotle, on the other hand, insists on the meaning of "one" as "homogeneous",
